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Imitation gets a bad press: we
know it is the sincerest form of
flattery, and of course for effective
education the learner must be
able to copy the teacher, but on
the whole, ‘imitation’ is linked to
shallow, cheap and even
fraudulent behaviour. It comes as
a shock to discover that, as far as
we know, most non-human
animals are unable to imitate [1]:
is imitation, after all, rather clever? 
In everyday human life, imitation
is remarkably prevalent: babies
imitate the facial movements of
adults within minutes of birth [2];
lovers find themselves
unconsciously mirroring the
other’s posture, and sycophants
do the same with the stance and
mannerisms of the powerful [3];
when you copy a friend’s wave in
a dense crowd it shows them
immediately you’ve seen them;
and even the most inarticulate
mechanic can show us what to do
to fix our car’s engine. Imitation
certainly comes naturally to
humans.
The idea that imitation is a
special faculty, critical in child
development and perhaps a
central aspect of human
uniqueness, has gained ground in
psychology over recent years
[4,5]. The discovery of ‘mirror
neurons’ [6,7] — cells in the
premotor area of the brain that are
activated by a hand performing a
simple goal-directed action and
respond equally whether the hand
is one’s own or another person’s
studies suggest that the
cytoskeletal architecture of
actively dividing cells is
incompatible with that required for
morphogenesis. Mutations in two
genes in C. elegans, gad-1 and
emb-5, lead to premature division
of the endoderm cells and their
failure to invaginate [18,19].
Concomitant with a heterochrony
in cell fate specification, a delay in
the lengthening of the cell cycle,
required for the reorganization of
the cytoskeleton of gastrulating
cells, might also contribute to the
distinct morphology of the
T. diversipapillatus ‘gastrula’.
Gastrulation was among the key
innovations of metazoan
evolution. It seems likely that,
once it was invented, the basic
mechanics were preserved while
many unique properties were
allocated to the various phyla of
animals. The radically different
appearance of gastrulation in C.
elegans and other metazoans may
have arisen from relatively modest
changes in the location and timing
of specification. Secondarily
simplified animals like C. elegans
have become exceedingly
parsimonious with their cells: for
example, the function of the
kidney in C. elegans has been
relegated to a single cell [20].
Similarly, it may be appropriate to
regard the two endoderm cells
that initiate gastrulation in this
animal as an invaginating sheet,
albeit a very small one. It is
conceivable that the cellular
mechanisms involved in
mobilizing germ layer progenitors
into the embryo interior may be
virtually identical, whether this
movement involves a large sheet
of cells or only two cells. Though
embryos appear very different on
the surface, inwardly they may be
closely similar.
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Social Cognition: Imitation,
Imitation, Imitation
Monkeys recognize when they are being imitated, but they seem
unable to learn by imitation. These facts make sense if imitation is seen
as two different capacities: social mirroring, when actions are matched
and have social benefits; and learning by copying, when new
behavioural routines are acquired by observation.
— offers hope of understanding
the neural basis of this important
ability. Confusingly, though, these
neurons were discovered in the
brains of monkeys — and
monkeys are thought unable to
imitate [8]. What is going on?
To find out, it is useful to
distinguish two kinds of imitation,
social mirroring, and learning by
copying, each of which seems to
function for a different purpose
[9]. To improve our car
maintenance, we need to augment
our skill repertoire by assembling
new programmes of behaviour —
the function is skill acquisition.
For imitation to help this process,
our brain must be able to decode
the behaviour of the expert
mechanic and then re-synthesize
it for ourselves, using as building
blocks simpler components that
we can perform already [10]. 
Learning by copying therefore
requires powerful perceptual-
cognitive processes to
decompose complex behaviour,
along with the ability to build up
new skills from simpler
components. But social mirroring
may in principle be achieved by
much simpler cognitive
processes, because it does not
require anything new to be learnt
[11]. (Smiling or tongue-protrusion
may be ‘new’ in a technical sense,
for a baby so young that it has
had little time to explore its small
behavioural repertoire, but no
learning is involved. Those actions
come naturally, as they are in the
baby’s latent repertoire.) 
Several forms of imitation seem
best understood as social
mirroring, those cases in which
the function seems to be some
form of empathy or mutual
identification. In each, imitation
shows the other that one is ‘in
tune’ with them, whether the other
is the mother of a new-born baby,
a lover or boss, or just a friend out
of shouting range. Social mirroring
is based on matching the current
behaviour of another with similar-
looking actions of one’s own: and
mutual identification requires
synchrony, not creativity. The
starting point for mirroring is
therefore to be able to recognize
when another is doing something
that the self can also do. This sort
of generalization, of course, is just
what mirror neurons achieve; so, a
monkey should surely be able to
recognize when another’s
behaviour is like its own. Until
now, it has been a puzzle that the
scarcity of monkey imitation
suggested otherwise.
Annika Paukner and her
colleagues [12] have now
resolved this anomaly by
empirically separating imitation
recognition from imitation itself,
and found that monkeys can
indeed recognize when another’s
behaviour matches their own. In
their experiment, two humans
performed actions in synchrony
with a monkey’s own. Both
humans and monkey manipulated
similar small cubes with hands
and mouth. However, one person
copied the precise actions the
monkey was doing at the time,
whereas the other performed
other actions — just as monkey-
like behaviour, but not the
precise actions the subject was
using at that time. Monkeys
consistently preferred to look at
the person who was imitating
them, except when they were
mouthing the cube — perhaps
because they were then unable to
see clearly what the humans
were doing.
Mirror neurons have sometimes
been misleadingly described as
‘monkey see, monkey do’ cells,
but the work of Paukner and
colleagues [12] strongly supports
the interpretation given by the
original discoverers of mirror
neurons, Giacomo Rizzolatti and
collaborators [13]. They argued
that the mirror neuron system
functions by identifying the
current disposition and likely
future actions of other
individuals. In the experiment of
Paukner et al. [12], the monkey
responds to the special
disposition of the imitating
human, the fact that ‘we’re in
tune’. If the ability to recognize a
familiar action being done by
another is combined with a
tendency to do the same thing,
then a simple but powerful
mechanism for social mirroring is
the result, and this has been
called response facilitation [11].
We do not, of course, find
ourselves copying the actions of
everyone we observe: only
‘significant others’ trigger
response facilitation. Who we
find significant will vary with
circumstances: for a new-born,
any adult carer; for a toddler,
mum or dad, but an adolescent
more often identifies with peers;
for lovers, loved-ones; for a
sycophant, a strong boss, and so
on. But in each case when
behavioural mirroring is seen, the
same simple underlying
mechanisms may be in operation.
Response facilitation may also
underlie many experimental
results in animals that have been
interpreted as learning by
copying, imitation sensu skill
acquisition. The procedure most
widely used as an experimental
test of imitation, the ‘two-action
methodology’, does not require
any new behaviour to be built up.
In the test, a chimpanzee for
instance is shown a box opened
by means of one of two simple
actions, both of which suffice to
open it; the behaviours are
familiar ones to the subject, but
the puzzle box is new [14]. Then
the chimpanzee is given a closed
box: the data shows that it will be
more likely to try first whichever
action it recently saw done. 
It is possible that this test
recruits imitation for skill
learning, and that even if the
procedure had been a novel one
the chimpanzee would have
managed to copy it, thus adding
to its repertoire of skills. But a
simpler explanation is that
response facilitation causes
mirroring of the recently seen
action. (Of course, as the action
is effective, the chimpanzee will
be likely to use it again under the
same circumstances; but that is
conventional associative
learning.) Interestingly, human-
reared chimpanzees and
monkeys have given much
stronger evidence of imitation in
these experiments [15,16] —
precisely as would be expected if
the mechanism tapped is social
mimicry rather than learning by
copying, as for human-reared
primates people are much more
significant others, and humans
do the demonstrating in all these
experiments.
Two major questions remain
for the future, and their answers
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may be related: is mirroring of
familiar actions also involved in
learning by copying, and can any
non-human animal learn by
copying? It is not impossible that
the two kinds of imitation, whose
differing functions hint at
separate evolutionary histories,
rely on quite unrelated brain
mechanisms. Learning by
copying involves hierarchical
construction of a behavioural
program [9], just as does
linguistic syntax, so a common
origin is possible, uniquely on the
human line of evolution. But it is
tempting (and parsimonious) to
relate the powerful properties of
the mirror neuron system to the
perceptual deciphering required
in learning by copying. 
Some theorists view the
imitative learning of a 2 year old
child as simply an extension of
neonatal imitation [17]: as social
mirroring develops, it enables
learning by copying. This simple
scheme leaves unexplained why
macaque monkeys do not follow
the same developmental path,
and seem unable to learn by
imitation. Alternatively, it has
been suggested that imitative
learning co-opts the perceptual
decomposition power of the
mirror neuron system, evolved
originally in response to social
needs, for a new purpose [10]. In
animals that are able to construct
new behavioural routines by
hierarchical planning, then the
sequence of actions picked out
by the successive firing of mirror
neurons becomes far more useful,
as the basis for constructing a
novel, complex skill. 
Monkeys and very young
children lack such hierarchical
constructional ability, so their
imitation is restricted to social
mirroring. Although learning by
copying has proved difficult to
study experimentally in animals,
observational evidence implies
that great apes learn their
elaborate feeding skills by
imitation [18]. If so, then the
evolutionary origins of syntactical
skill may lie earlier than the
advent of language itself, in the
feeding needs of our ancient
ancestors and their flexible
co-option of an existing neural
system [19].
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The mechanisms that contribute
to accurate chromosome
segregation are manifold and
complex. The players have been
identified from early genetic
mapping studies, cytological
observations of autoimmune
patients and genetic screens in
model organisms. Centromeres
are responsible for directing the
assembly of a complex
proteinaceous structure, the
kinetochore. The kinetochore
provides the linkage between the
chromosome and microtubules of
the mitotic spindle. How the
kinetochore engages the
microtubule, promotes the
complex oscillatory dance by
which replicated chromosomes
attain correct attachment, yet
maintain the ability to correct
errors has been the subject of
intensive study. 
This is a complex process, but
the idea that we might be able to
dissect it by genetic and
molecular analysis was given a
Chromosome Segregation: Seeing
Is Believing
For chromosome segregation in mitosis, each centromere directs
assembly of a complex, proteinaceous structure — the kinetochore,
which connects the chromosome to microtubules of the mitotic
spindle. A recent study has provided important new insights into the
mechanism by which kinetochores capture spindle microtubules.
